Revisiting securitization theory within the context of North Korea: A theoretical analysis of the success of Trump's policy

Abstract

This empirical study, grounded in securitization theory, questions whether the security utterances of former U.S. President Donald Trump on North Korea between January 20, 2017, and June 12, 2018, constituted only a securitizing move or evolved into a successful securitization practice. The research employs a hybrid methodology, combining discourse and content analyses supported by quantitative data. The focus is on analyzing the discourse within a corpus of 44 securitization statements made by the president. These statements were discerned through a comprehensive review of all the president's public remarks throughout the designated period, using queries such as "North Korea," "Democratic People's Republic ofKorea (DPRK)," "Kim Jong Un,"etc. Employing discourse analysis, the study reveals the referent objects and securitization arguments in these statements. The data gleaned from these statements is subsequently analyzed utilizing content analysis methodology. This study also evaluates the securitization discourse by examining its compliance with the facilitating conditions of an effective securitization rhetoric, a capable securitizer, and an audience-acceptable threat selection. Subsequently, it discusses the efficacy of the securitization discourse in terms of the two principal parameters proposed by the Copenhagen School: audience acceptance ofthe threat narrative contained in the securitizing moves, and the adoption of extraordinary measures.