Strategic pricing in a differentiated product oligopoly model: Fluid milk in Boston
dc.contributor.author | Cotterill, Ronald W. | |
dc.contributor.buuauthor | Canan, Başak | |
dc.contributor.department | Bursa Uludağ Üniversitesi/Ziraat Fakültesi/Tarım Ekonomisi Bölümü. | tr_TR |
dc.contributor.scopusid | 15822920800 | tr_TR |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-12-27T06:10:59Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-12-27T06:10:59Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2006-07 | |
dc.description.abstract | In an imperfectly competitive industry, differentiated products compete with each other with price rather than quantity as the strategic variable. Several previous studies have employed a generalized Nash-Bertrand model: Liang (1989), Cotterill (1994), Cotterill et al. (2000), and Kinoshita et al. (2002); however, only Liang has explored the theoretical foundations of that model. This article generalizes the Liang two-good model to three goods. A surprising and important result follows. Price-conjectural variations do not exist in models with three or more goods. Price-reaction functions, however, exist in multiple-good models. We estimate them jointly with a brand-level demand system to evaluate the total impact of a brand manager's price change on own quantity. In a differentiated product market, this is a useful addition to a partial demand elasticity approach, because a change in one brand's price typically engenders a price reaction by other brands that affects own quantity via substantial cross-price elasticities among substitutes. Strategic pricing in the Boston fluid milk market was also influenced by the existence of a raw milk price support program, the Northeast Dairy Compact. We find that the advent of the Compact was a focal point event that crystallized a shift away from Nash-Bertrand to more cooperative pricing. If the downstream market is not competitive, one needs to consider strategic price reactions when designing and evaluating agricultural price programs. | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Canan, B. ve Cotterill, R. W. (2006). ''Strategic pricing in a differentiated product oligopoly model: Fluid milk in Boston''. Agricultural Economics, 35(1), 27-33. | en_US |
dc.identifier.endpage | 33 | tr_TR |
dc.identifier.issn | 0169-5150 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1574-0862 | |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | tr_TR |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-33744903697 | tr_TR |
dc.identifier.startpage | 27 | tr_TR |
dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2006.00136.x | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2006.00136.x | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11452/23634 | |
dc.identifier.volume | 35 | tr_TR |
dc.identifier.wos | 000237971900004 | tr_TR |
dc.indexed.scopus | Scopus | en_US |
dc.indexed.wos | SCIE | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Wiley | en_US |
dc.relation.collaboration | Yurt dışı | tr_TR |
dc.relation.journal | Agricultural Economics | en_US |
dc.relation.publicationcategory | Makale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi | tr_TR |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess | en_US |
dc.subject | Agriculture | en_US |
dc.subject | Business & economics | en_US |
dc.subject | Price-conjectural variations | en_US |
dc.subject | Oligopoly | en_US |
dc.subject | Focal point collusion | en_US |
dc.subject | Brand-level demand elasticities | en_US |
dc.subject | United states | en_US |
dc.subject | North America | en_US |
dc.subject | Massachusetts | en_US |
dc.subject | Boston | en_US |
dc.subject | Price dynamics | en_US |
dc.subject | Oligopoly | en_US |
dc.subject | Milk | en_US |
dc.subject | Market conditions | en_US |
dc.subject | Private labels | en_US |
dc.subject.scopus | Dynamic Discrete Choice; Dynamic Structural Model; Discrete Games | en_US |
dc.subject.wos | Agricultural economics & policy | en_US |
dc.subject.wos | Economics | en_US |
dc.title | Strategic pricing in a differentiated product oligopoly model: Fluid milk in Boston | en_US |
dc.type | Article |
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