BIV şüpheci argümanı ve çağdaş tepkiler
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Date
2013
Authors
Öztürk, Fatih S. M.
Sarı, Mehmet Ali
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Uludağ Üniversitesi
Abstract
BIV argümanı, dış dünya bilgisinin olanaksız olduğu sonucunu desteklemeye çalışan radikal bir şüpheci dedüksiyondur. Geçerli ve hatta son derece makul öncülleri olan bu çıkarıma, güvenilirliği noktasında yani öncüllerinin doğru olmadığı yönünde bir takım itirazlar yapılmıştır. BIV argümanınşüpheci sonucunun önünü kesmek için geliştirilen bu itirazlar çağdaş epistemolojide önemli bir yer tutar. Argümanın temel dayanaklarını hedef alan bu tepkiler, Moorecu anti-septisizm, yanılabilircilik, ilgili alternatif teorileri ve bağlamcılık başlıkları altında toplanabilir. Fakat ne var ki bilginin imkanı problemi hakkındaki bu tartışmalar Türkçe literatürde yok denecek kadar azdır. Bu makalenin temel amacı, literatürdeki söz konusu bu boşluğu az da olsa doldurmayı denemektir.
The external word scepticism is the view that the evidence we have for the truth of our beliefs about the world falls short of what is required for knowledge. The most powerful sceptical argument proceeds by means of radical sceptical hypotheses. A sceptical hypothesis involves a scenario in which we are systematically deceived about the world but everything in our experience is exactly as it would be if we were not deceived. Take, for example, your belief that you have hands. Clearly, this belief is incompatible with the claim that you are a brain in vat (BIV). That is, if you are a BIV, then it is false that you have hands. So using the BIV hypothesis, the skeptic argues as follows. (1) You don’t know that the BIV hypothesis is false. (2) But if you don’t know that the BIV hypothesis is false, you don’t know that you have hands. Therefore, you don’t know that you have hands. The BIV argument is clearly valid and has two plausible premises. Yet its conclusion amounts to saying that we have no knowledge of the external world
The external word scepticism is the view that the evidence we have for the truth of our beliefs about the world falls short of what is required for knowledge. The most powerful sceptical argument proceeds by means of radical sceptical hypotheses. A sceptical hypothesis involves a scenario in which we are systematically deceived about the world but everything in our experience is exactly as it would be if we were not deceived. Take, for example, your belief that you have hands. Clearly, this belief is incompatible with the claim that you are a brain in vat (BIV). That is, if you are a BIV, then it is false that you have hands. So using the BIV hypothesis, the skeptic argues as follows. (1) You don’t know that the BIV hypothesis is false. (2) But if you don’t know that the BIV hypothesis is false, you don’t know that you have hands. Therefore, you don’t know that you have hands. The BIV argument is clearly valid and has two plausible premises. Yet its conclusion amounts to saying that we have no knowledge of the external world
Description
Keywords
Şüphecilik, BIV hipotezi, Moore, Yanılabilircilik, Kapanış ilkesi, İlgili alternatifler teorisi, Bağlamcılık, The BIV argument, Fallibilism, Relevant alternatives, The closure principle, Contextualism
Citation
Öztürk, F. S. M. ve Sarı, M. A. (2013). "BIV şüpheci argümanı ve çağdaş tepkiler". Kaygı. Uludağ Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Felsefe Dergisi, 21, 127-142.