A methodological discussion on evaluating the success of any securitizing move

Abstract

The study objects to lay out a lucid perspective on ‟how any securitizing move occurs successfully” an issue that was non-rigidly theorized in the Copenhagen version of securitization, in line with current debates. To this end, the vague criteria as follows, set by the classical cadre of the Copenhagen School are problematized: actors have to couch the issue as an existential threat requiring exceptional executive powers, and, if the audience accepts the securitizing move, the case is established as a security issue beyond the routine procedure of politics. Considering this conservative cycle, the first claim of this paper is that the politics of ‟audience acceptance” is not adequately determined in theory. The second is that the classical variants’ persistence in the transition to ‟exceptional security policy” in the operation of securitization, ignoring its insecure nature, reduces the theory to a given and fixed understanding of security such as ‟security=exceptionalism.” Premised on these arguments, the paper proposes an overarching systematized thought that empowers the audience’s role; does not exclude ‟exceptional measures” but also inserts into ‟normalized exceptional” and even ‟routine responses” as actions.