Hulya Yaldır· The Cartesian Ma n; The Hybrid Entity E merging from an Intimate Unification of the Min d a nd Body Abstract The term ·canesian dualism' is commonly used to lump together all forms of 'consciousnesses under the single category of the mental. Alongside thought and extension. modem interpreters of the Cartesian philosophy have often inclined to disregard Dcscanes' presentation of a thı rd category. the category of sensatian and imagination. However, Descartes' philosophy of mind strongly points out a threefold distinction instead of a simple duality. In this anicle, after a brief chronological survey of the Cartesian theory of the mind-body union, I try to arguc against the allcged inconsistency of Descartes' view and the supposed uninıelligi bility of his doctrine of the three pıimitive nations. namely, mind, body, and their union. Key Temıs: Descarıes. mind. body, substantial union ve primitive nations. Kartezyen İnsanı: Ruh (Akıl) ve Bedenin Yakın ilişkisinden Doğan Melez Varlık Özet ' Kanezyen ikicilik' terimi ·genellikle tüm bilinç formlannı tek bir zihin ya da bilinç kategorisi altında toplamak için kullanılmıştır. Düşünce ve uzarnın yanısıra, Kartezyen felsefesinin çağdaş yarumcuları Descartes' iıı ortaya attığı veya tanıttığı hayalgücü ve duyum kategorisi olarak adlandın l an üçüncü bir kategoıiyi sıklıkla göz ardı etmektedirler. Halbuki , Descartes' in zihi n felsefesi basit bir ikilik yerine üçlü bir ayınma işaret eder. Bu makalede. Kartezyen ruh-beden birliği kurarrunın kısa bir kronolojik araştırmasını yaptıktan sonra, Deseanes'in görüşünde iddia edilen tutarsızlık ve onun üç birincil kavramlar, akıl, beden ve onların bı rleşi rru dakırininde varsayıl an anlaşılamazlığına karşı (fi lozofun bu konudaki orijinal ve dikkate değer yönlerini) tanı şmaya çalışacağım. Analuar Terimler: Descartes, zihin, beden. tözsel birl ik ve birincil kavramlar. 1. Descartes ' Approval of the Unity of Man The nature of a human being appears to be extraordinarily mysterious in the Cartesian P hilosophy. This is because, on the one hand, Descartes' philosophy Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Letters and Arıs, Pamukkale University The Cartesian Man 10 particularly in its metaphysical and epistemological grounds, suggests certainly a composite human nature - a composition of a pure incorporeal soul or mind and the mechanical confıguration of the body. Descartes himself insisted in the Sixth Mediration that ·ood has bestowed on me ... a combination of mind and body' (AT VII 82; CSM Il 57), and indeed argued in favour of the 'real distinction' between these two different constituents. However, on the other hand, if we take into consideration all the Cartesian statements on the issue of the mi nd and body relation, it also becomes evident that Descartes' philosophical program draws our attention to the unity of human naıure. The lirst distinctive reference to the unity of man in Descartes' writings can be discovered in one of the passages from the Rules for tlıe Directian of our Naıive lmelligence, one of his earliest major work, where our author states: 'Turning now to the fırst factor, I should like to explain at this point what the human mind is, what the body is and how it is informed by the mi nd, what faculties within the composite whole promote knowledge of things, and what each particular faculty does' (AT X 411 ; CSM I 39-40). From this preview, given in a valuable manuscript written in the mid to Iate 1620s, we can realise that the young Descaı'tes has already in mind a conception of a human being as a union of mind and body. Another early valuable source for an understanding of the Cartesian approach to the question of mind and body union is the Treaıise on Man (Traire de L'Homme), written 1629-1633, which constiıutes a single work in conjunction with Le Monde (The World) . In this treatise, Descartes begins to express his view on the unity of man as follows: These men will be composed, as we are, of a souı and a body. First ı musı deseribe the body on its own: ıhen the souı , again on its own; and fınally ı must show how these two natures wouıd have to be joined and united in order to constituıe men who resernbıe us. In this text, Descartes seems to refer to the hypothetical men by the words 'these men'. The hypothetical men must have been introduced by him in an earlier lost seetion of the above mentioned treatise, and they are intended to be semblances of real human beings, just as the general description of an 'imaginary new world ' in the Chapter 6 of Le Monde, is meant to be a semblance of the real corporeal world. Ata later period, the passage from the Discourse, whose full title is Discoıırs.de la Metlıode pour bien conduire sa raison, et clıerclıer la verite dans /es scıenc~s ('Discourse on the Method of rightly conducting one's reason and seeking th~ truth ın the sciences'), fırst published anonymously in 1637, constitutes another unmısıakable reference to the idea of the unity of man in Descartes' writings. There in Part ~ıx, our philosopher announces, for the fırst time, the mutual and intimate relation of ının~ and body by expressing the idea that 'I showed how it is not suffıcient for it [the raııonal soul] to be lodged in the human body like a helmsman in his ship; except per.haps 10 move its limbs, but that it must be more closely joined and united with the body ın order to have, besides this power of movement, feelings and appetites like ours and so constitute a real man' (AT VI 59; CSM I 141). Descartes here cateoorically rejects the Platonic strain of thought, and thus ma~es it clear that he has no p~rsonal sympathy for the analogy of the pilot and the ~hıp to explain mind-body relation. In any case, the next source from which on~ can dı.scov~r the Cartesian interest in the notion of manasa union of mind and body ı s contaıned ın The Cartesian Man l l the Medirarions on rlıe First Plıilosoplıy (Meditariones de Prima Plıilosoplıia), published in 1641 in Paris, as Descartes ' philosophical a nd metaphys ical chef-d'oeuvre. In the S ixth Mediatio n, having reconstruc ted the exis tence of the external world and argued for the real distinction between mind and body, Descartes finally offered judgement about the unified nature of human being. 1 Exceptionally, there the Cartesian meditator is speaking of himselfas ·my who le self, in so far as I am a combination of body and mi nd ' (AT VII 81; CSM II 59) . The assertian of such a unity is al so approved by our philosopher a few paragraphs earlier in the same treatise: 'It is true that I may have (or, to anticipate. that I certainly have) a body that is very c losely jo ined to me' .2 Certainly, Descartes' ideas in the Mediatiotıs about the mind and body relationship gave rise to great interest as well as concern among the contemporary theologians, philosophers, and logicians of that period {1640-42). For instance, the theologian and logic ian Antoine Arnauld in the Fourth Set of Objection to the Mediations questioned Descartes' arguments of the mind-body distinction and deli vered the fo llowing judgement: ' It seems that the argument proves too much, and takes us back to the Platonic view ... that no thing corporeal belongs to our essence. so that man is merely a rational saul and the body merely a vehicle for the saul- a view which gives rise to the definitio n o f man as 'a soul which makes use o f a body' (AT VII 201; CSM II 143). For Arnauld, it is very diffıcult to believe that Descartes ' idea of the ' union ' of mind and body is compatible with the doctrine of the 'real distinction between mi nd and bod y' .3 But. the cha rge o f such Plato nism is denied by Descartes in his replies to the Fo urth Set of Object ions: No r do I see why this argument 'proves too much ' . For the fact that one thing can be separated from anather by the power of God is the very least that can be asserıed in order to establish that there isa real distinction between the two. Also, I thought 1 was very careful to guard against anyone inferring from this that man was simply 'a soul which makes use of a body'. For in the Sixth Meditation, where I dealt with the distinction between the mind and the body, ı also proved at the same time that the mind is subsrantially united with the body (AT VII 227-8; CSM ll 160. emphasis added). For the idea of the unity of man, see particularly the famous passage in the Sixth Meditation (AT Vll8 1; CSM ll 56). In the Sixth Meditation, it is possible to find more references to the ·composite' of soul and body (AT VII 85; CSM ll 59), (AT VII 82: CSM II 56), (AT VII 82; CSM ll 57), Letter to Hypcraspistes of August, 1641 (AT III 422; CSMK 18 9). In these documents, Descartes does not simply deseribe man as a combination of mind and body. Most importantly, the human being is conceived to be the hybrid entity emerging from an intimar e uniflcarion of the mi nd and body: in this regard see al so Lener to Regius of January, I 642 (AT III 508; CSMK 209). Antoine Amauld. the courageous supporıer of the unorthodox theology of the Jansenists, the severe eritic of the Jesuits. and the advocator of mind-body unity, does not seem to be convinced by Descartes' argument for the unity of the human being in the Sixth Meditation. Descartes especially writes two Jetters to Arnauld to defend the thesis of the Fourıh Set of Replies by tirmly maintaining the union of mind and body: For [Amauld] of 4 June, 1648 (AT V 192: CSMK 354) and For 1A mauld) of 29 July. 1648 (AT V 219: CSM Il 356). The Cartesian Man 12 Dutch physician Henri le Roy Regius, the Chair of Medicine at the University of Utrecht in 1638, was a close friend of Descartes and had taken pleasure in teaching Cartesian ideas on phys ics and physiology. He somehow interpreted and represented Descanes' position as insisting that the union of mind and body is ens per accidens, that is to say, man is ens per accidens. This surely meant that the human being is nothing more than a 'composition ' of mind and body that are accidentally united with one anather during the indi vidual's terrestrial life- soul uses body for its own purposes so as to prepare itself for eternal life. This being the case, there is no essential unity between soul and body and thus the human being is not ens per se - a real being in its own right. Dutch theologian Gisberts Voet Voetius, Professor of Theology and the Rector of the University of Utrecht, was an acrimonious enemy of Descartes, and prohibited the teaching of the Cartesian philosophy in the university. He condemned the work of the enth'usiastic disciple of Descartes, Regius, who had portrayed the Cartesian position on the human being as an ens per accidens, since, for him, such a view was not only atheistic but also at odds with the traditional scholastic philosophy.4 Descartes was conscious of the fact that the real target of this attack on the issue was at heart himself rather than his disciple Regius. And thus, he urged his friend Regius not to be offensive to orthodox thinkers at the University of Utrecht, and asked him to endorse the view that man is not an ens per accidens but actually an en s per se. At the end of his Jetter to Regius of January, 1642, Descartes himself makes it clear that he is not willing to tolerate any interpretation which regards man as an ens per accidens, and recapitulaıes his view of man by using rather scholastic terminology: Wc affirm that human beings are made up of body and saul, not by the mere presence or proximity of one to another, but by a true subsıantial union. ... If a human being is considered in himself as a whole, we say of course that he is a single ens per se [essential unity], and not per accidens: because the union which joins a human body and soul to each other is not accidtntal to a human being,_but essential, since a human being without it is not a human being (AT lll )Q8; CSMK 209).5 The next significant Jetters to demand our a ttention on this issue were compos~ between 21 May and 28 June 1643. They were specially written by Descartes to hıs royal friend Princess Elizabeth in the hope that they could provide the most comprehensive and elaborate explanations of the notian of the union of mi nd and body. In the fırst Jetter of 21 May, our philosopher presents his view to his admirer: 'Your Highness ... There are two facts about the human soul on which depend all ~he knowledge we can have of its nature. The fırst is thai it thinks, the second is that, beıng united to the body, it can act and be acted upon along with it' (AT lll 664; CSMK 217- 18). Letter to Father Dinet (AT VII 582-596; CSM U 392-93). _ . CSMK See for more information on this: Letter to Regius of Oecember, 1641 (AT III 460 2' . 200-1), Letter to Regius of January, 1642 (AT III 491-509; CSMK 205-9), Letter to Regıus of July, 1645 (AT IV 248; CSMK 254). The Cartesian Man 13 Importantly, Descartes allows one more distinctive 'primitive notion' , that is, the notian of the union of mind (or soul) and body, over and above the notian of extension and the notian of thought. 6 In his second letter to E lizabeth of 28 June, the master explains to the Princess ho w we can conceive the unity of mind and body in these fo llowing lines: First of all thcn, I observed one great difference between these three kinds of nations. The soul is conceived only by the pure intellect; body (i.e., extens ioıı, shapes, and motions) can likewise be known by the intellect alone, bul much beller by the intellect aided by the imagination; and fınally what belongs to the union of the soul and the body is known only obscurely by the iııtellect alone or even by the intellect aided by the imaginatioıı , but it is known very clearly by the senses (AT III 691-2; CSMK 226-7). Descartes a lso cannot avoid considering and including the issue of mind-body union in the contexts of his academic textbook, the Principles of Plıilosoplıy (Principia Plıilosoplıiae), which was fırst published in Latin in 1644, and then appeared in French in 1647, and was specially dedicated by its author to Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. This treatise comprised the most extensive account of the Cartesian philosophical, metaphysical and scientific system. The fallawing passage, from Part One of the treatise in questio n, clearly intends to establish the thesis of the union of mind and body; and it sign ifıcantly sheds light o n our knowledge of this unity in a way similar to that adopted ina letter to Elizabeth of 28 June: 'I recognise only two ultimate dasses of things: first, intellectual or thinking things, i.e. those which pertain to mind or thinking substance; and secondly, material things, i.e. those which pertain to extended substance or body ...B ut we also experience within ourselves certain other things which must not be referred either to the min d al one or to the body alone. These ari se ... from the close and intimate union of our mi nd with the body' (AT VIIIA 23; CSM I 208-9). Clearly, theseremarks indicate that our comprehension of the union of the soul and body is only possible through everyday experience or sensory perceptions rather than through the operations of intelieel and imagination. 'It is' said Descartes to Elizabeth 'the ordinary course of life and conversation, and abstention from medilation ... that teaches us how to conceive of the union of the soul and body' (AT III 692; CSMK 227). The next signifıcant source to magnetise our attention on this issue is the last phi losophical work of Descartes, the Passions of the Soul (Les Passions de l'iime), published in 1649 and again dedicated to the Princess. This treatise in fact came into existence as a result of Descartes' correspondence with Elizabeth on the issue of the soul's relation with the body, and significantl y reflects the author's latest developed ideas on the theme of mind-body relationship. In it, Descartes substantially stresses the close and intima te union between mi nd and body as the title of 30 of Part One precise ly announces it: 'The saul is united with all the parts of the body conjointly (AT XI 351 ; CSM I 339). So far, we have provided a brief histarical survey of the passages where one can locate Descartes' treatment of the union of mind and body in his original writings and Letıer to Pıincess Elizabeth of21 May 1643 (AT HI 665; CSMK 218) The Cartesian Man 14 correspondence. Certainly, this survey might be more extensive, but I imagine these textual references from Descartes' writings on the thesis of the mind-body union will be suffıcient for our purposes for the moment. In the course of our review it becomes evident that in Descartes ' account there are two fundamental elements that are essential for our understand ing of his doctrine of the unity of mi nd and body in the human being: {l) the union of mi nd and body is the 'primitive notion' and (2) the mind-body union is a substance - the 'substantial union' of mind and body. Now, we shall continue our discussion with an analysis of what Descartes means by the primitive notian of mind- body union. 2. The Primitiveness of the Notion of Mind-Body Union The most important passage where Descartes presents the thesis of mind-body union as a primitive, basic or simple notion is unquestionably his Jetter to Princess Elizabeth of2l May, 1643. In it, Descartes portrays the issue to her Royal Highness as follows: I consider that there are in us certain prirnitive notions which are as it were the patterns on the basis of which we form all our other concepıions. There are very few such nations. First, !here are the most general - those of being, number, duration, ete. - which apply to everything we can conceive. Then, as regards body in particular, we have only the notion of extension, which entails the nations of shape and motion; and as regards the soul on it s own, we have only the noıion of thought, which in cludes the percepıions of the intelieel and the indinations of the will. Lastly, as regards the soul and body together, we have only the notion of their union, on which depends our notion of the soul's power to move the body. and the body' s power to acı on the soul and cause it s sensations and passions (AT III 665; CSMK 2 18). In this passage, Descartes clearly sets out and draws our attention to, four kinds of primitive nations that constitute the fundamental building blocks of the human knowledge. They are the common or general notions, the notion of extension, the notian of thought, and the notion of the union of mind and body. Descartes' classifıcation of the primitive nations as such has sometirnes been bypassed by the modern expositors of the Cartesian philosophical system, which either focuses on a twofold distinction (thought and extension, i.e., dualism) or a threefold distinction (thought, exıension, and the category of sensation) .7 It clear that the term 'primitive notions' used in the Jetter to Princess Eliza~~ has exactly the same meaning as the terms 'simple notions' in the Principles and sımple natures ' .in the Regulae.8 In spite of the fact that Descartes subsequently seems to forsake .the jargon of the 'simple natures', he uses these terms interchangeably. as synonyms when discussing the objects or items of knowledge. For instance, the d~~r~ne of 'simple notions' given in the Principles is reminiscent to that of the 'prı~ıııve nations' of the Jetter to the Princess. There, o ur philosopher expresses the idea ın the For a trialistic distinction, as opposed to a standard dualislic one, see John Cottingham· article, called 'Cartesian Trialism' , John Cottingham, 'Cartesian Trialism' , PP· 218-JO. See also, Brian O' Neil' useful article, 'Cartesian Simple Natures', 161-79. The Cartesian Man 15 fo llowing manner: ' to enable us to ge t rid of these preconceived opinions, I shall here briefl y list all the sinıp/e nations which are the basic components of our thoughts; and in each case I shall distinguish the clear elements from those which are obscure or liable to lead us into error' (AT VIIIA 22 ; CSM I 208)0 Once more, on this occasion ' the most gmeral items which we regard as things are substance, duration, orcler, number and any other items of this ki nd which extend to all classes of things ' (AT VIIIA 22-3; CSM I 208, eınphasi s added) are also included in the category of the simple notions, besides the notions of thought (mind or soul) and extension (ınatter or corporeal substance)o9 Furthermore, and more signi fıcantly, the most momentous thing here is Descartes' affirmation of the notian of mind-body unity through experience: 'But' says the philosopher ' we also experience wi thin ourselves certain other things which must not be referred either to the mindalone or to the body ala neo These arise oo o from the close and intimate union of our mind and body' (AT VIIIA 23; CSM I 209)0 Again, the doctrine of the 's imple notian of mind-body unity' offered in the Prüıciples here bears a resemblance to the idea of the ' primitive notion of mind-body unity' which appeared in Descartes' correspondence with Princess Elizabeth of 21 Mayo In the Regulae, Descartes uses the term ' simple natures' as an alternative common name for the four kinds of ' primitive nations' of the Jetter to Elizabeth and the 'simple nations' of the Principleso At this stage, it is important to raise the question, what Descartes means by a 'primitive notion' , 'simple notion' or simple nature' ? By the term primitive, simple notia n or nature he refers to the simple nations or item (ioeo the basic starting points or concepts) which appears the most transparent, clear and distinct to the human intellect. The philosopher puts it in better words: 'That is why, since we are concerned here with things only in so far as they are perceived by the intellect, we term 'simple' only those things which we know so clearly and distinctly that they cannot be divided by the ınind into others which are more distinctly known' (AT X 418; CSM I 44)0 Thus, the primitive nations or the simple natures are actually conceived to be epistemological items, rather than ontological ones, 10 and accordingly each belongs to an independent Principles (AT VIII A 23; CSM 1 208-9); Cf. Daniel Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical physics, po 91 0 10 In thi s regard, see Jean-Luc Marion' s inıeresting and valuable article, entitled 'Cartesian mctaphysics and the role of the simple natures', where he tak es in to consideration Descartes' doctıine of the simple natures and assesses the Cartesian position as follows: 'The simple nature remains the simplest term, but the simplicity is an epistemological, not an ontological one: it does not relate to essence or ousia oo O The result isa concept or "idea" that is distinctly and oıiginally Cartesian: " idea" defıned as an object . that is pıimary in respect of our knowledge and not in respect of its ousia or essence - primary in so far as it is "easy" to knowo and not in respect of som e indivisible form or eidos', po I 16° Marion is clearly correct in this evaluation as Descartes himself makes it clear: 'Hence we are concemed with things only in so far as they are perceived by the intellect, and so we term 'simple' only those things which we know so clearly and distinctly that they cannot be divided by the mind into others which are more distinctly known' (AT X 4 18; CSM I 44). Descartes' concept of simple notions is certainly differenı from Plato 's concept of ideas, forms or eidos. Although for Descartes simple notions are the contents of our consciousness and we have immediate The Cartesian Man 16 v~I(UY2t realm of knowledge. The not ions are primitive or simple since they are known singiy in order, separately from a ll other notions, and cannot be made inte lligible by reference to each other. 11 Descartes explains the primitiveness of the not ions to Princess Elizabeth more plainly by say ing that ' if we try to sol ve a problem by means of a notion that does not pertain to it, we cannot help goi ng wrong. Si milarly we go wrong if we try to explain one of these notio ns by another, for since they are primitive notions. each of them can be understood o nly through itself(AT TII 665-6; CSMK 2 18) .12 Clearly, Descartes here is drawing our attention to the fact that each o f these primitive notions enter into a special epistemological domain. The kno wledge and apprehension of mind, o f body. and signifıcantly of the mind-body union can only be acquired through their own primitive notio ns. What is important here is to note Descartes' endo rsement of the 'primiti veness' o f the concept of 'mind-body union'. One can achieve awareness and penetration of the unio n o f mind and body by appeal ing to the 'primit ive unity of mind-body' , that is i ts primitive notion, but not by invoking the two diffe rent primitive no tio ns (i.e. the primitive notion of ınind and the primitive notion of body). Certainly, this idea, that is to say, the primitiveness of the notion of mind-body union was the heart of many of the criticisms of the Cartesian doctrine of the unity of mind and body. The commentators have often cast doubt on the conceivability of the primitiveness of the notion of mind-body un ion by raising·the question that hov1 something that is composed o f two distinc t primitive notio ns could yield a primitive no tion? How can o ne cal! a thing 'primitive ' if its existence is dependent upon the unification of the primitive notio n o f mi nd and the primitive notion of body, which are two distinc t items? The primiti veness of the notio ns of mind and body, from whose composition or close relatio nship something or some kind of union emerges, rules out the possibi lity that such a thing or unificatio n should be entitled a primiti ve notion. 13 However, Descartes' respo nse to such critic isms is much more convincing than one might expect. The way in which he explains the notion of mind-body union forces us to thin k that such a union is indeed a primiti ve notio n. In a Jetter to Princess Elizabeth of 28 June, the philosopher puts the matter perspicuously: First of all I distinguished three kinds of prirrtitive ideasor notions, each of which is known in i ts own proper manner and not by comparison with any of the others: awareness of them, according to Plato, ideas are the etemal and unchanging truıhs as archetypes existing independently outside the human rrtind. 11 See Letter to Princess Elizabeth of 2 1 May, 1643 (AT III 665-6: CSMK 2 18 ); Letter ı o Elizabeth of 28 June, 1643 (AT lll 691 ; CSMK 226). 11 ; Letter to Princess ~lizabeth of 21 M ay, 1643 (AT III 665-6: CSMK 21 8). 1 Danıel Garber claıms the unıntelligibility of the prirrtitive notion of mind-body unity in his book De~car~es ' Metaphysical Physics. p. 92; Daisie Radner also argues for the impossibiliıy of t~e prımıtı veness of the Cartesian concept of mind-body union in her article 'Descanes' Notıon of the Union of Mind and Body', pp. 163-4 and 168; in this regard, Janet Broughton and Ruth Matıem make a criticism of Radner in their paper called 'Reinterpreting Descanes on the Notton of the Union of Mi nd and Body'; Radner's makes a counter-objection to them in her article entitled ' ls There a Problem of Cartesian Interaction?' p. 39. The Cartesian Man 17 the notions we have of the soul, of body and of the union between the soul and the body (AT lll 691; CSMK 226). 14 In this passage. Descartes e liminates the common or general notions from the category of the simple or primitive notions possibly due to their applicability to both the materi al and the intellectual primiri ve notio ns. Instead, he offers a trialistic picture rather than dualistic (i.e., the notion of thought, the notion of extension) and foursome network (i.e. , the general notions, the notion of thought, the notion of extension, and finall y the notion of the union of mind and body). Each of these primitive notions corresponds to a different facul ty anda different realm of knowledge: ' I observed' says Descartes 'one great difference between these three kinds of notions. The soul is conceived only by the pure imellect; body (i.e., extension, shapes, and motions) can likewise be known by the intellect alone , but much better by the inte llect aided by the imagination; and fınally what belongs to the union of the soul and the body is known only obscurely by the intellect a lone or even by the intellect aided by the imagination, but it is known very clearly by the serıses ' (AT III 691-2; CSMK 226-7, my emphasis). Firstly, the primitive notion of mind can o nly be apprehended by means of the facu lty of pure inte llection, and is the subject matter of pure metaphys ics. Second ly, the primitive notion of body can be perceived through the faculty of imaginatio n, and is included in the field of mathematical physics. Moreover, fınally and most importantly, the primi tive notion of the union of mind and body can be grasped and penetrated through the faculties of the senses, and is the subj ect of ordinary, or non-philosophical awareness. 15 In hi s correspondence with Elizabeth, Descartes clearly illustrates how the apprehension and the study of each of t hese primit ive notions necessitate the operation of different faculties and the realm of knowledge: That is why people who never philosophize and use only their senses have no doubt that the soul moves the body and that the body acts on the soul. They regard both of them [i. e. , the soul and the body] as a single thing, that is to say, they conceive their union; because to conceive the union between two things is to conceive them as one single thing. Metaphysical thoughts, which exercise the pure intellect, help to familiaıise us with the notion of the soul; and the study of mathematics. which exercises mainly the imagination in the consideration of shapes and motions, accustoms us to form very distinct notions of the body. But it is the ordinary course of life and conversation, and abstention from medilation and from the study of the things which exercise the imagination, that teaches us 16 ho w to conceive the union of the so u! and body (AT III 692; CSMK 227). There is no doubt that Descartes ' recogni tion of the primitive notion of 'mind-body union' , besides the primitive notion of mi nd and that of body, within an epistemological context, appears to be a significant s tep forward towards achieving a true understanding 1 ~ Letter to Pıincess Elizabeth of28 June, 1643. 15 See, particularly, Letter to Mersenne of 13 November, 1639 (AT ll 622; CSMK 141 ); Letter to Mersenne of 15 April , 1630 (AT I 144; CSM K 22) and (AT 1 144-5; CSMK 22-3); Principles (AT VIIIA 4; CSM I 192); Jean-Luc Marion, 'Cartesian Metaphysics and the Role of the Simple Natures', p. 117, (trans. by John Cottingham); Stephen Gaukroger, 'The nature of abstract reasoning: philosophical aspects ofDescartes' work in algebra', pp. 108-11 1. 16 Letter to Pıincess Elizabeth of 28 June, 1643. The Cartesian Man 18 of human nature. We may have perception of the primitive notion of mind and that of body, but the notion of their unity stili needs to be comprehended. This knowledge can only be acquired wi th the aid of the senses, 17 but not by means of composition of two distinct primitive notions. Now it is time to turn our attention to another significant element in Descarıes' doctrine of mind-body union. It is important to understand what our philosopher means by the notion of 'substantial union' of mi nd and body. 3. Substantial Unity of the Mind and Body It is necessary to be thoroughly acquainted with Descartes' canception of 'substantial union' - the idea that the mind and body are really and substantially united - so as to understand the true nature of the living human being. In his original writings and correspondence, there are passages where Descartes uncovers his view of man, that is, the unity of a human being as the union of mind and body through some kind of 'strong fabrication of unity' rather than just a combination of two distinct things. It is argued that our conception of the mind-body unity, from which a real human being emerges, goes beyond what is actually fabricated by just a mere conjunction of two elements (mind and body). In the passages from the Fourth Set of Replies, and the letters to Regius, Father Dinet, Princess Elizabeth, and Mesland, our philosopher especially brings to light a very strong anti-Platonic conception of the mind-body union by making use of the Aristotelian-scholastical adjectives 'substantial' and 'real'. For instance, having in mind to avoid the charge of Platonism, in the Fourth Set of Replies Descartes puts the matter in a rather scholastic jargon by insisting that 'the mi nd is substantially united with the body (AT VII 228; CSM II 160, emphasis added). The concept of the substantial union between mind and body is signifıcantly further referred to in a letter to Regius of January, 1642, where the philosopher writes to his fr iend support of the view that 'a human being is a true ens per se, and not an ens per accidens, and that the mind is 18 unitedin a real and substantial manner to the body (AT II 493; CSMK 206). Towards the end of the same correspondence, Descartes uses approximately similar expressions to emphasise the idea once more: 'human beings are made up of body and soul , not by mere presence or proximity of one to the other, but by a true substantial union ... [Tlhe union which joins a human body and soul to each other is not accidental to a human being, but essential' (AT m 508; CSMK 209) . In these passages and the similar ones of 19 the kinds, Descartes obviously intends to establish the notion of a human being as a real mind-body union - mind and body are not merely connected, but rather mind is 'substantially' , ' really' , ' truly', and 'essentially' united wi th the body. 17 See Sixth Meditation (AT VII 81 ; CSM II 56). 18 Letter to Regius of January, 1642 (AT ll 493; CSMK 206). 19 See Letter to Mesland of 9 February, 1645 (AT IV 166; CSMK 243); Letter to Father Dinet: (AT VII 585; HR II 363). The Cartesian Man 19 By employing these adverbs, Descarıes seems to suggest a type of 'strong' mind body unio n in oppositio n to the Platonic doctrine o f the mind-body unifıcation. It is well known from dialogues of Socrates, that Plato conceives human being as an ens per accidens, that is to say, the human being is a composition of soul and body. The soul a disembodied , self-moving, eternal, simple, self-suffıcient, incorruptible spiritual being which constitute the essence of man, and is accidental ly attached to (or imprisoned by) the body during the individual 's earthly li fe. It uses the body for its own purposes and always struggles to free itself from the impediment and the imprisonment of the bod y. Being accidentally united with the body, the soul continues to be, even after the destruction of the body: 'When death attacks a man, his mortat part, it seems, dies; whereas the immortal part gets out of the way of death, departs and goes away intacı and undestroyed' .20 This is obviously an inevitable implication of the view of mind- body union held by Pla to. In the Fo urth Set o f Replies, Descartes opposes his position on the no tia n o f the mind-body unio n or relationship with that of Plato, by emphasising the assertian that 'the mind is substantially united with the body' (AT VIII 228; CSM II 160). Referring back to the argument from the real distinction between mind and body in the Sixth Meditation, he considers himself to be proving from it the kind of stro ng mind-body unifıcation that make up the human being. In the same Replies, the philosopher clearly states that 'I was very careful to guard against anyone inferring from this [i.e. , the real distinction between mind and body] that man was a 'soul which makes use of a body' (Ibid. ). Moreover, in a further attempt to keep away the charge of Platonism, Descartes makes a comparison between a human being (i .e. a mind-body union) and an ' incorporate' angel - an angel that makes use of a bodil y mechanism. Both angel and human mind are concei ved by our thinker to be incorporeal spi rits taeking of the characteristics o f extensio n and divisibility. Although they themselves are not extended, an angel and a mind are both capable of acıing upon extended things (AT V 270; CSMK 36 1).2 1 Nevertheless, there is a fundamental difference between an 'embodied ' angel and a human being that is a mind-body union. White the former one is not capable of experiencing sensatia n (sentire) , the latter can do so by reason of the fact that the mind is really and s ubstantially united with the body. It is the nature of sensatian that is conceived to be the signifıcant factor for the establishment of the 'substantial union ' of mind and body that constitutes a real human being, and differentiates o ur nature and mental life from that of an angel, a pure incorporeal spirit that makes use of, and temporally resides, in the body. As a reaction to Regius ' interpretation of the Cartesian position as representing that human being is an ens per accidens - a composition of soul and body, Descartes advises his friend to put the matter quite the otherwise in those lines: ' whenever the occasion arises, in public and in private, you should give out that you believe that a human being is a true ens per se, and not an ens per accidens, and that the mind is united ina real and substantial manner to the body. You must say that they are united not by position or disposition, as you assert in your paper - for this too is open to objection and in my view, quite untrue - but by a true mode of union, as 20 Plato, The Phaedo, (trans.) D. Gallup, p. 61. 21 Letter to More of 5 February, 1649; Sixth Set of Replies (AT V II 425-6; CSM Il 287); Lerter to Regius of January. 1642 (AT III 493; CSM K 206). The Cartesian Man 20 everyone agrees, though nobody explains what this amounts to, and so yo u need not do so either' . And in the same passage the philosopher continues by expressing the view that 'You could do so , however, as Ididin my Metaphysics, by saying that we perceive that sensations such as pain are not pure tho ughts of a mind distinct from a body, but confused perceptio ns of a mi nd really united to a body. For if an angel were in a human body, he would not have sensations as we do, but wouJd simpJy perceive the motions which are caused by external objects, and in this way would differ from a real man . .. '(AT III 493 ; CSMK 206). In those remarks, it is evident that great importance is pJaced on the notion of the mind-body union as a singJe thing existing in its own right rather than on the notion of the mind-body union as a composition of two different substances (mind and body). This consideration naturally leads us to the verdict that the mind-body union asa singJe thing existing per se is itself a substance. This means that a human being is itseJf a substance, and not the product of the synthesis of an incorporeaJ souJ and a corporeaJ body, which are two different substances. Descartes actually tries number of manoeuvres for the rehabiJitation of the concept of the human being that had been apparentJy wounded and torn apart by his offıciaJ dualistic ontoJogy, as well as by his metaphysical arguments for the mind-body distinction. Once more, in another Jetter to Regius of December, 1641 Descartes emphatically rejects his follower's assertian that man is ens per accidens, that is, the human being is a composition of two distinct substances : [Y]ou say that a human being is an ens per accidens. You could scarcely have said anytrung more objecliunable and provocative. The best way I can see to remedy this is for you to say . . .. you u nderstood it to be an ens per se' (AT III 460; CSMK 200). 22 Both of these Jetters written by Descartes to Regius in December, 1641 and January 1642 co nstitute signifıcant sources for the notion of the mind-body union in the Cartesian phiJosophy of mind. In these sources, the philosopher courageousJy tells his friend to change his view that the human being is an ens per accidens, that is, not an entity existing in i ts own right, since the unifıcation of two different substances does not give rise to an essentiaJ unity but form a contingent unity. Rather, Descartes advises Regius to adopt the view that the human being, that is, the mind-body union is an ens per se - an entity in its own right (Ibid., and AT III 493; CSMK 206). Descartes deJiberately seems to use the terms, namely 'substantiaJ manner' and ' real manner' in these passages and in many others so as to convey the idea that the outcome of the unity of mi nd and body is itseJf a substance.23 This is obvious from the fact that, in the course 22 Letter to Regius of December, ı 641. 23 s ome experts interpret Descartes' notion of the mind-body union in terms of causa l interaction; according to them, when Descartes maintains that mind and body are united, he actually means that they are capable of causal interaction, see for this line of thoughl, Margaret Wilson, Descartes, p. 219; Daisie Radner, ' ls There a Problem of Cartesian In teraeti on?' , pp. 38-9; and id em., ' Descartes' Notion of the Union of Mi nd and Body', p. 162. However, there is an other line of thought which explicitly holds the view that in Descanes mind-body union gives rise to a third category of substance, in addition to incorporeal and corporeal substances (mind and body). This view is defended by: Tad M. Schmaltz, 'Descartes and Malebranche on Mind and Mind-Body Union ', p. 288; Paul Hoffman, 'The The Cartesian Man 2 1 of his discussion of substantial forms and real qualities, when the adjectives, 'substantial' and in particular ' real' are added or attributed to something, he in fact ıh i nks that it is a substance. This is well illustrated in the Sixth Set of Replies, where the philosopher deseribes the notio n of gravity that he he ld during his youth as follows: ·For example, I conceived of gravity as if it were some sort of real quality, which inhered in solid bodies; a lthough I called it a 'qual ity', thereby referring it to the bodies in which it inhered, by adding that it was 'real' I was in fact thinking that it was a substance ' (AT VII 44 I ; CSM II 297). The strong version of the unity, the one is which the mind-body union is itself a substance, is mainly presented in scholastic terminology and overcomes the weak version of the uni ty; the one is which mi nd and body unionisa composition o f two different substances. Descartes' claim that 'rlıe union ıvlıich joins a human body and soul ro eac/ı other is not accidenta! to a human being, but essential, since a human being ıviılıouı it is not a lıu11ıalı being' (AT III 508; CSMK 209, emphasis added) constitutes a decisive evidence for the notian of the mind-body union as an ens per se, i.e. a thing that exists in it s own right, that is the substance. 4. Conclusion: Descartes' account of the mind-body union deserves special attention. Although the philosopher, o n the one hand , acknowledges a special relation of the human soul to its own body, he. on the other hand, argues in favour of the independent existence of the human soul from the bod y, fro m which immortality is entailed. Descartes as 'scientist' establishes the unio n of soul and body by rely ing upo n the facts of experience, but on the other hand he as ' re tlective thinkers' argues for the real distinction, and thus the possibility of the survival of the human soul, by means of the process of the philosophical or metaphysical contemplation. Descartes insists that the human being, that is, the m ind-body union is an ens per se (i.e .. a thing in its own right) but not the combination of two distinct substances. He appears to be determined to e lucida te a s trong anti-Platonic conception of the mind- body unio n by making use of much stronger terms, for instance. mi nd is 'substantially', 'really', ' truly'. and 'essentiall y' 'jo ined, ' intermingled' and 'uni ted' with the body. The philosopher uses his famo us disanalogy between the mind-body union and a sailor and his ship in order to illustrate the intimacy and substantiality of mind and body (AT VII 81; CSM II 56). Moreover, in his correspondence to Princess E lizabeth of 21 May, 1643, he declares the primiıiveness of the concept of mind-body union in an epistemological sense of the term, as distinct from on ontological one. The notion of mind-body union is a primitive notio n in so far as it capable of being understood Uniıy of Descartes' Man' , p. 346; L. J . Beck, The Meraphysics of Descarres, pp. 271 -4; R. C. Richardson, 'The "Scandal'' of Canesi an lnteractionism', p.35; Janet Broughıon and Ruth Maııem, 'Reinterpreting Descartes on the Notion of the Union of Mind and Body' , p.27; A1though Professor Cottingham draws our auention to a threefold d isıinetion of the primitive notions in Descartes, he does not explicitly endorse the idea the mind-body union brings about a third substance in the Cartesian projects, See John Coııingham, 'Cartesian Trialism'. pp. 127-32 and his Descartes, p. 127, The Cartesian Man 22 through itself. W e acquire the knowledge of the union of mind and body in terms of its primiti ve notion (as primitive unity of mind-body), but not in terms of primitive notions of mind and body, which are two different things. What Descartes has in mind here is that the ordinary, pre-philosophical man, who never reflects upon the metaphysical arguments of the Meditaıions and thus lacks the knowledge of the nature of the mind and that of the body, is perfectly capable of conceiving of his own unifıed nature (as pure mind-body union) by means of the operation of the faculties of the imagination and the senses. It is, says Descartes to his royal friend, ' the ordinary course of life and conversation, and abstention from mediations ... that teaches us how we conceive of the unio n of the soul and the body (AT II 692; CSMK 227).24 The study of metaphysical issues, in so far as they exerc ise the pure intellect, enables us to acquire the knowledge of the essence of the mi nd; and the study of the mathematical problems, in so far as they exercise the faculty of the imagination, enable us to attain to the knowledge of the essence of the body (the nature of corporeal bodies in general). Nevertheless, pre- philosophical li fe and everyday experiences help us to comprehend the knowledge of the essence of the mind-body union, as this exclusively exercises the senses. Descanes' recognition of the primitiveness of the concept of the mind-body union as an epistemo logical item is the most remarkable and original feature of his doctrine of the mind and body union. Descartes' epis tem