The Place of "The Fifth Meditation" in the Philosophy of Descartes Talip KABADAYI 1 Abstr act lt Slrikes me thal i ı is vital ı o tigure out lhe position of "the fıfth meditation" in Descartes' phi losophical system because the onıological argunıenı seı forılı there by him is very con- vcnicnl for Descartes lO prove the existence of God, si nce in his argunıent for God's exis- teııce he should not use any premi se lo which refer material world. 1 can say that Descartes demonstrates the necessary existencc of God since without the knowledge of God, no o1her forms of knowledge could be possiblc. In other words, in Descartes"s philosophy, knowledge is possible because God is necessary . In thi s paper, it is aimed at analyzing and clarify ing this problem so ıhat wc can dctermi ııe the place of the fifıh medilation in Des- carıcs· philosophical system. Key u•ords: mcditation, prove. prernise. knowledge. possible, necessary. Ö zet "Beşinci Meditasyon"un Descartes Felsefesindeki Yeri Descartes' ın felsefe sisteminde "Beşinci Meditasyon'"un vazgeçilmez bir yerinin olduğunu kavramak kmıımca çok önemlidir, çünkü Dcscartes' ın orada ortaya koyduğu ontolojik ka- nıtlama (delil) ya da tanrının varlığı için sunduğu ispat, maddi dünyaya göndermede bulu- nan herhangi bir öncüle başvurmak zorunda kahnmadan yapılmıştır; bu nedenle de bu ka- nıt lanıa Descartes' ın amacı bakımından çok uygundur. Ona göre, tanrı bi lgisi olmadan başka hiçbir bilgi ya da bilgi forınu olanaklı deği ldir. Şu halde, Dcscarıes felsefesinde bil- ginin olanağı tanrının zorunlu vmlığına bağlıdır. Bu çalı şmanın amacı. bu problemin çö- zümlenmesi ve açığa kavuşturulması için Descartes' ın "Beşinci Meditasyon"unun onun felsefe sistemindeki yerinin belirlenmes iyle mümkün ol acağın ı gözler önilne sermekıir. Anahtar kelime!e r; mediıa~yon. ispat, öncü!, bilgi, olanaklı , zorunlu. Introduction R. Deserirtes (1596- 1650) com posed treatise s on mathematics, physics and philoso- phy. Mathematics was his favor ite study because o f the certainty of its proofs and the evıdence of its reason ings. H e devised the geome try called 'analytic ' or 'coordinate'. Descartes o nce sounded o ut that he had a dream in which the marvelous interconnec- tions of the c iences were revealed to him. This moment of lumi nous certitude was fa l- lowed by years of medirat ion o n science and philosophy with a view to working o ut a 1 Assı. Prof. Adnan Menderes Uni versity, Department of Phi losophy. The Place of "The Fifth Meditation" in the Philosophy of Descartes reliable method of reaching true conclusions (Brennan 1967: 446-47). Let us here take advantage of his principle philosophical work the Meditatio11s 011 First P/ıilosoplıy so as to see his main ideas regarding method mentioned just above. He was aware of the fact that leamed men disagreed on every subject. Was it not likely that there were some propositions above dispute? If so, so me should fınd them and build human knowledge on them. Descartes was convinced that he had a sound method for discovering proposi- tions being certain. He would take into considerat ion all the propositions that it was not o ut of the question to conceive of and fıgure out if it was not impossible to doubt them al l. He could even q uestio n the objective existence of the wo rld of his experience due to the fact that this world might be an illusion or a dream induced in him by a mighty evi! genius. Finally Descartes arrived at a propositio n of such specifıcity that he was not possibly able to call it into doubt. That was the proposition " I think, therefore ı exisf'". Descartes says that I know that I exist because I am thinking. Even if there should be some powerful malignant dernon cheating on him regarding the whole world, at the very least there exists a Descartes being cheated or deceived (Descartes 1986: 17-8). Des- cartes goes o n to say that as he observed that this truth " I think, theretüre I am", was so certain that no ground of doubt could be alleged by the Sceptics capable of shaking it, he drew the co nclusion that he might, without doubt, accept it as the fırst principle of the philosophy o f which he was in search (Descartes 197.4: 63). Descartes then proceeds to search fo r other certai n propositions. According to Brennan, for Descartes, the judgment ' I exist' has such peculiar clarity and distinctness that it is not possible to doubt it. Are there any o ther j udgments similarly clear and distinct? Descarıes was convinced that the judgment 'a perfect being exists ' had the requisite clarity and distinctness and that the propositio n expressing it w as certain. Descartes puts forward that the truth of the propo- sitio n 'God exists' is self-evident. O nce one fıgures out what this proposition means he/she canno t possib ly do ubt it. Having to his o wn satisfaction established the certainty of 'God exists'. Descartes makes the conclusion that human knowledge is fundamentally reliable, provided that one employs it properly. For God, being good, would not endow us with a faculty inhere ntly deceptive (Brennan 1967: 97). And, in Buchdal's point of view, it is Descartes ' cante ntion that the self, as thinking substance, cannot arise out of nothing; recognizing himselfas limited he must postuiate a cause of its existence (Buch- dal 1969: 175). This problem is my starting-po int to shed light and set forth so that w: can determine the logical place of the God and of the fıfth medilation in Descartes philosophical system. * In the beginning of the fıfth meditation, Descartes starts asking the question of \vhat material things are in essence. When he is discussing about the ideas of corporeal world, he sees another way o f proving the existence of God. It is this proof that I aim 10 illustrate right now. By the time he came to prove the existence of God, he had spoken of quantity, size, fıgure and so o n which are the categories of "extended substance'_'. Furthermore, these ideas are known by him clearly and distinctly through hı s • For more about this very discussed proposition cf. Yavuz Kılıç , "Cogito, Ergo Sum Önermesi Üzerine Birkaç Söz", H.Ü. Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, Aralık 2005. The Place of "The Fifth Meditation" in the Philosophy of Descartes imagination. Descartes goes on to say that he has so many ideas in him which have i nımuıabl e and ırue natures, even though they do not refer to anything in external world. For example. he has an idea o f triangle which is immutable and eternal because this idea is not dependent upon his mi nd. T hat is to say, a triangle has some characteristics which do not dep~nd on him ; for instance, it is the property of a triangle that its three angles equal two rı ght angles and so o n. As a res u lt, Desearte s' poi nt is this: even if there is no ligurc in external world, whenever he thinks of a triangle, this triangle is a determinate ııature which can not be separated from it. I think what he is saying is this; a triangle is the object of mathematics which has a s hape or other items which Descartes clearly and distinctl y percei ves (Descartes, 1986: 45). Having illustrated the mathematical items which he clearly and distinctly perceives, he gm:s on by sayi ng that "if the mere fact that l can produce from my thought the idea ııf ~onıeıhing entails that everything which I clearly and d istinctly perceive to belong to that ılıing really does belong to it. is not this a possible basis for another argument to prove the existence o f God?" (Descartes. 1986: 45). This is the criterion which Descanes can use as an evident to prove the existence of God. As a matter of fact, according to Descartes, "there are o nly two ways of proving the existence of God, one through his effects. the other through his very essence or nature" (Williams, 1978: 153}'. lı is this second way, through the essence, wh ich has been called Descartes' ontological argunıenı. According to Descartes, the idea of God. which is a supremely perfeci being, is as clear and distinct as the idea o f any shape. So there cannot be a perfeci being which does not conta in existence for Descartes. Since existence is a pertecıion, perhaps the highest pertection, it will be contradictory not to include in it the distinctness of the clear and distinct idea of God. Therefore, existence must necessarily be attributed to the idea of supreınely perfect bei ng. In other words, examining the idea he has of a perfect being, he finds that existence is included in this idea; consequently it is certain that God, who is th is perfecı being, exists. Descartes here is saying that there is an obvious logical connection between being God and existing, just as there is an obvious logical connection between being a triangle and having three angles that equal 180 degrees. However the idea of God isa special case because the idea of God possesses all perfections and for Descartes one perfection is existence itself. As a result of this. the essence o f God necessarily contains existence. As we have seen, for Descartes from the idea of God it fo llows necessarily that God actually exists. According to Descartes, at fırst g lance, this argument looks like a sophism; but the reason why this simple argument may appear a sophism is that as a rule, we make a distinction between essence and existence so that we do not see that in the case of God his essence involves his existence. This is one of the three possible objections to his argument which he proposes against himself. To repeat, essence and existence is Dcscarıes speaks of the existence of God also in his books Prin~iple~· of Philo.wplıy, .c hapter 1, parıicu larly the articles 13,14, 18-24, trans. V.R. Miller and R.P. Mıller, Dordrecht: ~· Reıdel, 1983; and 1\ Dismur.\·e 011 Method, Part 4, pp. 62-68, trans. John Veıtch, The Ratıonalısts , Descartes, Spinoza, Lcibniz, New York: Doubleday Deli Publishing Group, Ine, 1974. Cf. also Tal.ip KABA- DA YI, "Ontological and Cosmological Arguments in Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, H. U. Edebiyat Fnkiilte.\·i Dergüi, Ci lt: 19, Sayı: 1, p. 153- 163, Haziran 2002. The Place of "The Fifth Meditation" in t he Philosophy of Descartes inseparable in the case of God because such a supremely perfect being musı have all perfections and existence is itself a peıtection. ln other words, if existence is not a perfection, God could not be a supremely perfect being. For that reason. there is a logically necessary connection between being God and existing (Dcscartes, 1986: 46). Another possible objection is this. Descartes cannot think of God without existence. but that does not mean that he can think of God as existing, therefore God exists. Des- cartes goes on to say that "ıhere is a sophism concealed here. From the fact that I cannot thinkof a mountain without a valley, it does not follow that a mountain and valley exisı anywhere, but simply that a mountain and a valley, whether they exist or not, are mutu- ally inseparable. But from the fact that I cannot thinkof God except as existing. it fol- lows that existence is inseparable from God, and hence that he really exisıs" (Descartes. 1986: 46). What Descartes says is this; it is the necessity of God's existence that deıer­ mines his thought, and for that reason, he cannot thinkof God wi thout existence. This is called ''de re modalities" which necessity comes from the thing itse1f. On the other hand. according to Descartes, he could conceive of a horse with wings because he is free to think a horse with wings. So in this example of a winged horse, the winged horse is dependent upon Descartes' thougbt; that is to say, Descartes can thinkof a horse eithl!r with wings or without wings because there is no logically necessary connection between being a horse and being winged. However in the case of God, existence is a parıicular perfection which canno t be removed from God (Descartes, 1986: 46). Let us quo te the last possible objection and then try to explain it. Descartes says that while it is indeed necessary for me to suppose God exists, once I have made the supposition that he has all perfections (since existence is one of the perfecıions); nevertheless the original supposition was not necessary. Similarly. the objection would run, it is not necessary for me to think that all quadrilaterals can be inscribed ina circle: but given this supposition, it will be necessary for me to adınit that a rhombus can be inscribed in a circ!e which is patently false (Descartes, 1986: 46). In my view, W hat Descartes' point is this: If he thought a certain thing to be true. another thing would certainly follow from it inevitably. Only he does not need to think that thing is true and in the example he takes it is not. He goes on by saying that " now admittedly, it is not necessary that I ever light upon any thought of God; bul whenever l do choose to think of the tirst and the supreme being, and bring forth the idea of God from the treasure house of my mind as it were, it is necessary that I aıtribute all perfections to him, even if I do not at that time enumerate them or attend to them individually" (Descartes, 1986: 46-47). As far as I fıgure out, what Descartes says is this : First of all it is not necessary to think of the circle having such properties as to enable all quadrilateral fıgures to be inscribed in it. Secondly, if we did it, it would be false. On the other hand, in the case of God, while it is true that it is not always necessary to think of the idea of a perfect being, he cannot think of such a being as non- existent. In addition to this, there is no necessity for him to think of the tigure in relation to the inscribing of quadrilaterals inside it. As a result of these three possible objections, Descartes argues that this idea of supremely perfect being is not dependent upon his thought; on the contrary "it is an image of a true and immutable nature" (Descartes, 1986: 47). In order to supporı his argument, he gives other further considerations to us. Accordi~g to Descartes, God is the only supremely perfect being wbose existence pertains to his essence. Moreover, there is The Place of "The Fifth Meditat ion" in the Philosophy of Descartes only one God due to the definition of God that God is eternal, infınite, immutable, omniscient, omnipotent and the ereatar of all things (Descartes, 1986: 28). Finally a~cording to him. these attribuı.es of God which 1 ill ustrated above cannot be taken away from him. So far, 1 have tried to il lustraıe Descartes' ontological proof of the existence of God. :\~ we have seen, conceiving of God as a supremely perfect being, he noted that he possessed a clear idea of such a being within himself. For d iscovering the nature of God, he had only to discover what was contained in this idea. As a result, he found that the ıı.lea of existence was inseparable from God's essence even in ıhought. Anather way in which he expressed th is was by asserting that God, who is the supremely perfect being, cannot be thought of except as embodying every perfection. However. for Descartes cxi~tence is itself a perfection; so it fo llows that God cannot even be thought of except a~ a real being. As we have already seen again, Descartes goes on to say that existence is not contained in the idea of anyth ing else; whatever he might form an idea of, he can always conceive to be no n-existent a t some time or other, with the sole exception of God. For instance, no absurdi ty is involved in sayi ng that a winged horse either that it does or that it does not exist. However, in considering God Descartes maintained that one can no more conceive him as non-existent than one can conceive a plain triangle, the angles of which are not equal to the sum of two right angles. As a result, if one affirms that whaı he is thinking of does not have ang les equaJ to the sum of two right angles, then it follows either that his idea of a triangle is unclear or that he is thinking of ~omething other than a triangle. Siınilarl y, if one affirms that God does not exist, then it follows either that he is not applying the name God to a supremely perfect being or that his idea of God is very unclear in terms of Descartes. Befo re looking at the objectio ns and repl ies. I would like to say something about the ontological proof of the existence of God. Descarıes needed a deınonstration of God's existence and with it God's ırustworıhiness or verac ity for banishing his own philosophical skepticism and establish the rea lity of a mate rial world that he had professed to find himself capable of doubting. Hence ontological argu ment was very suitable to Descartes' purposes for proving the ex isıence of God. It is because Descartes' argument for God's existence should not use any premises which refer to material world si nce the existence of such a world is stili at thi~ stage of meditatio ns in doubt. In addition to th is, Descartes thought that the only sure way to metaphysical truth and certainty was through the formatian of clear and distinct ideas, which are dependent upo n the existence of God and the rational analysis nf them. * Now it is time to look at the Objections and R'l!plies which are related to the fifth meditation. In the fifth objections, the objector (Gassendi) c laims that Descartes is com- paring existence with a property to prove the existence of God. It would be alright if he compared essence with essence or existence with existence, but Descartes is wrong when he compares existence with a property. For example, he sho uld have cl~imed tha~ omnipotence or omniscience cannot be separated from the essence of God ınstead ot saying that existence cannot be separated from the essence of God. That is to say, the The Place of "The Fifth Meditation" in the Philosophy of Descartes objector is saying that existence is not a property; so it cannot belong to essence of God. Furthermore, he adds that we cannot talk about existence unless something exisıs ın reality; therefore, we cannot say that this thing is perfect or not perfect without knowing that or this thing exists in reality. According to the objector again, Descartes says that he cannot think of God without existence while he can think of a horse with or withouı wings. That is to say, without existence God cannot be a complete being in accordancc with Descartes. As a result, in the idea of a perfect being all perfections are included as well as existence. However, objector asserts that why can not we think of an idea of a perfect Pegasus, to wit, objector claims that by using the same reasoning which Des· cartes employed, it is possible to prove the existence of every perfect being, such as a perfect Pegasus or a perfect isiand (Descartes,l986: 95-96). Descartes answers the fıfth objections by saying that existence is a perfection; he is not saying that existence is a predicate· . However, whether or not existence is or is not a predicate, necessary existence is certainly an attribute of a perfect being because of God's essence. That is to say, it is impossible for such a being to have all the attributes of a perfect being except the attribute of necessary existence. In a few words, unless necessary existence is an attribute of God, God cannot be a perfect being. So Descarıes is talking about the necessary existence to which belongs God, not mere existence. In addition to this, thi s supremely perfect being preserves himself and everything including a triangle is dependent upon him; therefore we can separate existence and essence in everything except for in God (Descartes, 1986: 97). Again in the fifth objections, the objector claims that there is no differeııce betweeıı St. Thomas's defınition of God and that of Descartes'. It is because where St. Thomas says "that than which nothing greater can be conceived"'* Descartes says "a supremely perfect being". Furthermore, according to objector, their conclusions are the same. too. That is to say, bo th of them made conclusions that their notions of God imply exisıenı , therefore God exist in reality. I think objector's question is this; how can Descarıes show us that his argument is different from that of St. Thomas's? Secondly, he goes on to say that Descartes' argument is based on a supposition that supremely perfect being actually exists. He asserts that even if supremely perfect being implies the existence that does not mean that it really exists in reality. However, it shows that existence as a concepı is connected to the supremely perfect being as a concept. For supporting his argumenı , he ' Kant rejects ontological argument by stating that "existence is not a perfection or predicate", for more about it cf. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Rea.ı·on, trans. N.K. Smith, New York: The Macınillan Company, 1965, p. 505-507. Cf. als o Talip KABADA YI, "Ontolojik Delil Üzerine Anselmus ve Kant", Fel~efe Tarıışnıa/arı, 24. Kitap, Ocak 1999, ss.I00-107. • The objector seems to get the argument wrong, because the so-called expressian given by him pertains to st.Anselm, not to st. Thomas. Let me give the reasoning of Anselm fo r the sake of clarity. Asa rule. the ontological argument put forward by st. Anselm can be, in my opinion, worded shortly as follows: Anselm asserts in Proslogion that God is figured out to be a being than which nothing greater can be thought. Even the Psalm of the foo! denying the existence of God figures out the proposition a being than which a greater cannot be thought when hearing it. Besides, what he figures out is in his mind. Hence, a being than which a greater cannot be thought is in his mi nd. However, such a being cannot be only in the mind; because if it is in the mind, it can be ıhought to be also in reality; accordingly, since a being ıs greater if it is in the mind and in reality than if it is only in the mind, if it existed only in the mind, we could then thinkof a greater being, w hi ch is out of the question. Thus, a being than which a greaıer cannoı be thought is both in the mi nd and in reality (Anselm 1962: 54). The Place of "The Fifth Meditation " in the Philosophy of Descartes gives the example o f "existing lion". He says that this example contains both lion and existence as a complex thing. So, suppose that we removed either existing or lion from this complex unity, then it is no t going to be the same complex. From here, can we not say that existence pertains to the essence of the composite "existing lion"? So, what Descartes makes is a supposition that supremely perfect being contains existence; therefore, it exi sıs in reality. That is to say, there is no difference between the complex "existi ng lion" and "supremely perfeci be ing exists". Asa result, objector says that this proof tiır the existence o f God does no t work out (Descartes, 1986: 99). Descartes replies to his objector by saying that his argument is different from that of Sı. Thomas's; because St. Tho mas is inte rested if the existence of God is obvious to everyune. On the other hand, Descartes' argument is based on premises which are clear and distinct. So, having carefully investigated what God is, Descartes discovers that existence which is c lear and distinc t for him pertains to God's true and immutable nature; and he can claiın that Go d exists in reality which is the conclusion coming from the dear and distinct premises. In o rder to make his argument clear, Descartes says that we need to make a dit'fere nce between possible and necessary existence. W e can see the necessary existence in the case of God white we can observe the possible existence in everything other than God. That is to say, existence, which is in reality, is necessarily and always associated with the other qualities of God; therefore God exists in terms of Descarıes (Descartes. 1986: 100). D escartes goes o n to say that we have some ideas in us which do not contain true and immutable na tures, to wit, either we made them up or intellect put them together. For example, he conceives of a winged horse or an existing lion or a triangle which is inscribed in a square; however at the same time, he thinks of a lion without existing o r of a horse wi thout wings or of a triangle without a square because these ıhings, according to Descartes, have no true and immutable natures. That is to say, these things are capable o f existing but not necessarily. From here, he argues that if he had used the same argument which St. T homas employed, he would not have concluded that God exists necessarily; because according to St. Tho mas's argument, you can draw a conclusion that God is capable of existing not necessaril y exists (Descartes, 1986: 101). In sum, when we look at Descartes, in fact, he tries to prove God's existence from a mere defınition of the word "God". That is to say, existence is tho ught of as part of the deti nition of a supreme ly perfect being. Since God is the supremely perfect being and it has all perfections and existence is a perfection ; therefore God exists. So Descartes proves the existence o f God without using any contingent premise. In other words, Descartes claims that just as the idea of triangle necessarily i ncludes among the defıning attributes of having its three internal angles equal to two right angles, so the idea of a supremely perfeci being necessarily includes the attributes of existence. Asa result, we can no more think of a supremely perfeci which lacks existence than of a triangle which lacks three sides without contradiction. However, as we know from the fact that for being a triangle a fıgure must have three sides, it does not follow t~at there actu~lly aı:e any ırianoles, as in the case of the concept of a supremely perfect beıng. He explaıns thı s 0 diffıculty by saying that the essence of a tr iangle does ~ot include .the attribute of existence that of supremely perfeci be ing does. Therefore, ın that specıal case, we are auıhorized to conclude existence from a concept. That is to say, according to Descartes · The Place of "The Fifth Meditation" in the Philosophy of Descartes the only possible explanation of the non-existence of God would be a contradiction or inceherence in our concept of God. It appears to me that, for Descartes existence may not be a property of God. but "necessary existence" is. It is because necessary existence is a property ascribable to God in vi rtue of the fact that the assertian that God exists is a necessary truth. So Descartes is not ta tking about ord inary existence, but necessary existence. I can add that Descartes clearly seems to hold both that God's existence is a necessary truth and that existence is a part of the essence of God. Hence, as I said earlier, Descartes is tatking about necessary existence as a perfection. When we look at the meaning of God, we notice that it is incompatible with th is meaning that God's existence should depend upon anything. For that reason his existence is necessary and whether we believe in him or not, we must accept that supremely perfect being cannot be thought of as being brought into.existence by anything or as depending for his continued existence on anything. According to Descartes, as we have seen, the essence of God must be real because it is an essence inseparable from his continuous consciousness or experience of reality. Descartes makes a statement that it is the notion of the infini te precedes that of the fıni!,t(. So, Descartes' ontological argument has focused on this logical precedence. Descart'es here deals with ~ particular idea, the idea of God not that of anything else. That is. it is not the existence of anything in general, but an idea with a special character. Asa matter of fact, for Descartes, necessary existence is certainly an auribute of a supremely perfect being. It is because of Descartes' defın i t ion of a perfect being that it is not possible for such a being to have all the attributes of a perfect being except the attribute of necessary existence. That is to say, unless necessary existence is an attribute of a thing, that thing cannot be a perfect being. In addition to this, fo r Descartes si nce the idea of God is the very ground of our existence, it is more than an idea. So, if it had not existed. we would have had only vague and uncertain opinions. Accordingly, Descartes says that God is the source of his existence. In fact what Descartes claims is that what Descartes apprehends when he apprehends God is not the idea of God merely, but is God. Therefore, God is actually apprehended as existing, otherwise he could not be apprehended. Moreover, from Descartes' point of view, it would be absurd to think that Descartes existed, but that God, who conserves Descartes existence, does not exist. That is to say. the conserver's existence, namely, God's existence is the only real existence. As a result of this, not only our existence, but also our knowledge of something is dependent upon God. For example, Descartes can rely on his idea of a triangle to be always the same and he can rely on all the truths he fınds within himself to be always the same; besides he can trust his memory due to the existence of God. In conclusion, I think that according to Descartes, the question whether God exists or not is not a question you can decide; because it is not only decided for you by the \ICry nature of your knowledge of God but also this idea is innate in human beings. Descarıes discovers not simply that God exists but that it is impossible to think God as non- existent; and the impossibility consists in this that to think God as non-existent would imply to think his own non-existence which is impossible. It is because in that case Descartes cannot say that "I think; therefore I exist"; and again Descartes cannot say that "I think; therefore I exist" if existence is not a perfection or a predicate. It is vital to understand the position of the ontological argument in Descartes' philosophical system The Place of "The Fifth Meditation" in the Philosophy of Descartes because the o nto logical arguınent is very convenient for Descaı·tes to prove the existence of God si nce in his arguınent for God's existence he s hould not use any premise which refcr ınaterial world. Like I stated earlier, the idea of a perfect being is not only innale but has a peculiar nature that if anything is reınoved from it; it cannot be the idea of a perfert being in accordance with Descartes, who held that it is not possible that an inna te idea does not exist. As far as we are told, if an idea is innate, it must be necessarily true and cxist; otherwise it cannot have been an innate idea. In the tinal analysis, it can be argued that Descartes demo nstrates the necessary exi~tence o f God because the existence of God is very c ruel and important in Descartes' philo~ophy si nce without the knowledge of God, no other forms of knowledge could be possible. Refcr ences An~clnı ( 1962) Basic Wriıings. Trans. S.N. Deane, La Salle: Open Court Publishing Company. Brennan. J .G. ( 1967) 77ıe M eaning of Philosoplıy. New York : Harper & Row, Publishcrs. Buclıdal. G. ( 1969) Meıapltysics and ılı e Plıilosoplıy of Science. Cambridge: The MIT Press. Descarıes. Rene ( 1986) Mediıations on Firsl Plıilosoplıy. with selections from the Objections and Rcplies, trans. John Coııingham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press . ..... ( 1974) Discourse 011 method. trans. John Veitch. in The Rationalisıs, Descarles, Spinoza. l.eibniz. New York: Doublcday Deli Publishing Group, Ine . ... .. (1974) The Mediıaıions, trans. John Veitch, in The Raıionalisls, Descartes, Spinoı.a, Leibniı.. New York: Doubleday Deli Publislıiııg Group. Ine. Kabadayı. Talip f2002) "Ontological and Cosmological Arguments in Descartes, Spinoza and Lcibniz. H. Ü. Edebivar Fakültesi Dergisi. Haziran. Cilt: 19, Sayı: 1. Kabadayı. Talip ( 1999) ·. . Ontolojik Delil Üzerine Anselınus ve Kanı··. Felsefe Tarrışmalan, Ocak, ~4. K.!ap. . K:ınt.l. (1965) Criıiqtte ofPure Reason. trans. N. K. Smith. New York: The Macmıllan Company. Williams. Bernard ( 1978) Desear/e s, The Project Of Pure Enquiry, London: Penguin Books Ltd.